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ABSTRACT
Inferring a person’s goal from their behavior is an important prob-
lem in applications of AI (e.g. automated assistants, recommender
systems). The workhorse model for this task is the rational actor
model - this amounts to assuming that people have stable reward
functions, discount the future exponentially, and construct optimal
plans. Under the rational actor assumption techniques such as inverse
reinforcement learning (IRL) can be used to infer a person’s goals
from their actions. A competing model is the dual-system model.
Here decisions are the result of an interplay between a fast, auto-
matic, heuristic-based system 1 and a slower, deliberate, calculating
system 2. We generalize the dual system framework to the case of
Markov decision problems and show how to compute optimal plans
for dual-system agents. We show that dual-system agents exhibit
behaviors that are incompatible with rational actor assumption. We
show that naive applications of rational-actor IRL to the behavior of
dual-system agents can generate wrong inference about the agents’
goals and suggest interventions that actually reduce the agent’s over-
all utility. Finally, we adapt a simple IRL algorithm to correctly infer
the goals of dual system decision-makers. This allows us to make
interventions that help, rather than hinder, the dual-system agent’s
ability to reach their true goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Modeling human decision making and inferring a person’s latent
reward function from their behavior are important problems across
many fields [2, 12, 17, 37]. Typically such inference is performed
using the rational actor model. The rational actor model assumes
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that people have a fixed utility function (aka. reward function), dis-
count the future exponentially, and that they are capable of planning.
Assuming the rational actor model means that if we know a person’s
reward function we can predict their behavior they will take by using
dynamic programming to find (approximately) optimal plans [40].
Similarly, if we have observations of a person’s behavior we can
invert this behavior to learn the goals they are trying to achieve
[29, 34, 43].
Unfortunately, it is well known that the rational actor model fails
in many important decision environments [41]. The goal of this
paper is to ask whether the tools of planning and inverse planning
can be applied to the dual-system model (2S), a workhorse model of
human decision-making from the behavioral and cognitive sciences
[16].
The 2S views behavior as being controlled by two systems, system
1 which is automatic, fast, effortless and uses heuristics and system
2 which is slower, reflective, requires cognitive costs and deliberates.
This paper follows existing work in neuroscience and assumes an
interaction between systems as follows: when faced with a decision
first system 1 ‘suggests’ a course of action and system 2 uses costly
cognitive control to modulate this suggestion [13, 38].
An important example of violations of the rational actor model
occur in situations where people must trade off rewards now for
rewards later [1]. People plan to eat healthy, go to the gym, and quit
smoking tomorrow but when tomorrow comes, they reverse their
plans [30, 42]. Patterns of choices where one alternative is chosen
when the choice is made for the future but the other is chosen when
the choice is made for immediate outcomes (e.g. committing to
start eating healthy tomorrow but having a donut today) are called
dynamically inconsistent. Dynamic inconsistency cannot occur if
individuals are indeed maximizing a stable utility function which
discounts the future exponentially [30].1
The 2S model states that time inconsistency arises because de-
cisions are an interplay between a system 1 that seeks immediate
gratification and a system 2 that is able to consider long term impacts
of decisions [7, 28, 42]. When decisions are only about the future,
system 2 wants to commit to eating healthy and going to the gym
but when the donut is in front of us system 1 makes it hard to put
down.
This paper asks: what happens when decisions are not between
single actions but in temporally extended plans? We will consider
a computational model of the 2S planning as follows: the decision-
maker faces a Markov decision problem and the resulting choices
are a product of system 2 optimizing some utility function net of
1Another pattern of real world behavior that points to violations of the rational actor
model is the presence of commitment devices [4, 31]. People are willing to pay to
remove choices from their choice sets (e.g. pay a personal trainer to force them out of
bed at 6am for a workout). A rational agent (who can simply choose to follow through
on any plans made yesterday) would never make such a decision.
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cognitive control costs. The cognitive control cost of a decision is
proportional to how much it deviates (in terms of disutility) from an
optimal decision that system 1 would like to make.2 System 1 and
system 2 have different utility functions, discount the future differ-
ently, or both. This conflict gives rise to time inconsistent behaviors
as well as other violations of rationality. The model presented here
nests existing work such as the dual-self [7], and self-control pref-
erences [11]. It can also be thought of as a converged version of a
µAgent model [22].
There are three contributions in this paper. First, in many existing
models [7, 11] assume that system 1 is perfectly myopic (aka. cares
only about immediate rewards).3 Our work extends these models to
a system 1 capable of anticipating future consequences of a decision
today and adapts standard tools from reinforcement learning to make
the model work for arbitrary Markov decision problems. Second, we
show how inverse reinforcement learning [29, 43], applied naively,
can grossly mislead an analyst trying to learn a 2S agent’s goals
from their behavior. Third, we adapt a simple IRL algorithm to test
for dual-self decision-making or to recover the goals of a dual-self
agent from observed behavior.
Related Work
One way to model preference reversals in say that individuals have
hyperbolic [1] or quasi-hyperbolic [24, 30] discount rates (i.e. they
value x utils in the future as a function such as 11+kt x instead of
δ tx). In hyperbolic/quasi-hyperbolic models models the effective
discounting from waiting from t = 0 to t = 1 is larger than the
loss from waiting from t to t + 1. These models display preference
reversals, procrastination, and other ‘irrational’ phenomena [30].
Making dynamic predictions in such models require solving a game
between multiple ‘selves’ of an individual that exist at each time
period [6, 18, 19, 24, 30].
By contrast, 2S models assume the existence of multiple ‘selves’
(or systems) that exist consistently across periods [7, 23]. Systems
can have different utility functions [13], discount the future dif-
ferently [7, 23] or have different information sets [21]. In each of
these models decisions involve some way of combining inputs from
these two systems, and they can generate time inconsistent behavior
and even discounting patterns that look very similar to those of a
hyperbolic discounter [23].
There are two major advantages of the 2S framework. First, is
that it can be applied to decision environments beyond those where
decision-makers must trade off rewards now for rewards later. There
is strong evidence that system 1 and system 2 appear to differ in their
evaluations of many other decisions such as risk/uncertainty [15],
whether to be altruistic [33, 36], and moral decisions [10]. Second,
2S systems give a consistent welfare criterion - they can identify
whether an intervention improves or decreases an individual’s utility
unambiguously (provided we assume system 2 utility is an indi-
vidual’s true utility). Because hyperbolic models assume games
2Throughout the paper language like ‘desires’, ‘beliefs’, and ‘conflict’ will be used
to anthropomorphize system 1 and 2. This is not meant to imply the existence of
homunculi literally fighting within an individual’s head, rather the language is used to
convey intuitions behind concepts.
3This is not the case for all existing models, for example in [8] system 1 has a non-zero
discount factor. However, system 1 and system 2 share utility functions and differ only
in discount rates. In addition, that work considers applying the model only to simple
scenarios rather than arbitrary Markov decision problems.
between different selves at different time periods asking whether
an intervention made an individual better off requires asking which
time period’s ‘self’ we care about [30].
Finally, a growing literature argues that a key distinction between
system 1 and system 2 is how they learn [20, 21]. [21] argues that
system 1 is best modeled as a model-free reinforcement learner while
system 2 is more like a model-based planner. While we do not deal
with the dynamics of learning in this paper this conception provides
a plausible foundation for the assumption that system 1 and system
2 try to maximize different rewards. For example, after trying a few
donuts a model free system 1 may learn that donuts are delicious.
However, system 1 will not internalize the negative reward of not
following a diet because this negative consequence is far into the
future. On the other hand, the model-based system 2 can incorporate
this reward into it’s calculation of an optimal plan. Such dual-system
learning patterns have been observed in real world decision-making
where information that is personally experienced (e.g. having one’s
stock portfolio collapse during a recession) has a different effect on
decisions than information that is simply learned symbolically [27].
BASICS OF THE 2S MODEL
We will introduce the 2S model with a simple example and then
expand it to Markov decision problems. Consider a decision-maker
(DM). The DM is on a diet and is choosing between a delicious but
unhealthy donut (d) and a healthy but less flavorful kale smoothie
(k) as a snack.
The decision-maker has 2 reward functions r1 and r2 which rep-
resent systems 1 and 2 respectively. System 1 likes sugar whereas
system 2’s goals include the higher level goal of maintaining the diet.
This is formalized as r1(k) = 0 and r1(d) = 1 whereas r2(k) = 1 and
r2(d) = −1.
First we consider the DM making a choice for eating the snack
right now. Let a∗ be the system 1 optimal action (eat the donut). The
cognitive control cost of deviating to another action a by system 2 is
given by
CC(a) = ψ (r1(a∗) − r1(a)).
For simplicity let ψ be a linear function. System 2 trades off its
reward and this cognitive control cost, so choices are maximizers of
the combined function
VDS (a) = r2(a) −ψ (r1(a∗) − r1(a)).
Plugging in the rewards above gives VDS (d) = −1 and VDS (k) =
1 −ψ (1)
It is easy to see that in this case the DM chooses the kale smoothie
iff the cognitive control cost parameterψ ≤ 2.
Now let us consider the case where the DM is choosing a snack
now but will eat it tomorrow (t = 1). Rewards are received at the
time the snack is eaten and system 1 and 2 discount future rewards
are discounted by rates γ1 < γ2. System 1 still prefers the donut but
now the control cost of deviating isψ (γ1r1(a∗) − γ1r1(a)). Again the
choice is the maximizer of the system 2 utility net of control costs,
but now the DM chooses kale whenψ ≤ 2γ2γ1 .
Thus, there is a range of cognitive control parameters [2, 2γ2γ1 ]
where agents choose donuts today, but, if they are able to, commit to
eating kale tomorrow.
PLANNING WITH TWO SYSTEMS
So far we have dealt with a single decision, however, we can consider
a 2S DM making a dynamic choice. Suppose that at t = 1 a donut
will be available for lunch and the DM can pay some price at time
t = 0 for kale to be available at t = 1 as well. Would the DM be
willing to pay this price? There are several factors to consider. First,
ifψ > 2 then even if kale is available the DM would not choose it at
t = 1, thus DM would not be willing to pay at t = 0. Second, even
if the DM would choose kale system 2 must factor into the price
the cognitive control costs the DM will have to pay in the future
to actually make the choice. Third, if the DM will indeed choose
kale at t = 1 system 1 would prefer that the DM does not make kale
available - in other words, in the 2S model there is now a conflict at
t = 0 because of the anticipation of conflict at t = 1.
A Markov decision process (MDP) is a finite set of state S, a set
of actions A, a transition function which inputs a state and action
and outputs a distribution on the next states τ : S × A → ∆(S). A
2S DM has two reward functions which input a state and action pair
and output a distribution on real valued rewards ri : S ×A → ∆(R).
Systems discount the future with discount rates γ1,γ2.
We now extend the 2S model to MDPs with the formalization.
Our DM will be choosing a policy π which is a map from states
to actions (this can be randomized but in this paper we restrict to
deterministic policies). Each system has a value function Vi (s,π )
which inputs a starting state s and a policy π and outputs the expected
sum of discounted rewards from behaving according to this policy
starting in this state. A related object is each system’s Q function
Qi (s,a,π ) which takes as input a state, action, and policy and gives
the expected discounted sum of rewards from taking action a today
and following policy π starting at the next period.
Each system has an optimal policy it would prefer, we refer
to these as π∗1 , π
∗
2 . However, behavior will come from system 2
optimizing its reward function net of cognitive control costs. We
call the resulting policy the compromise policy. We now turn to
understanding what function this policy will actually optimize.
First, we need to ask how to calculate cognitive control costs
when we think about policies rather than single actions. As before
there is a tradeoff equation for system 2 given by
VCC (s,π ) = V2(s,π ) −CC(s,π ).
We will continue to think about the control costs as the difference
between utility gained to system 1 under π and π∗1 as with the single
action case. However, now a choice at time t now affects rewards at
t + k and we need to make decisions about how system 1 perceives
the future.
Again, actions are taken at each time step. Let us consider the
model where system 1 suggests an action π∗1 (s). What should the
cost be for deviating to a different action?
We now discuss two possible assumptions. We refer to them as
the naive or sophisticated system 1.4
4We will use the naive/sophisticated language of the literature on hyperbolic discounting
[30]. In that literature actions of a self in period t depend on expectations of that self
about the actions of future selves. Naive agents are those who assume future selves will
make the same decisions as the current self, sophisticated agents are those who play a
subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e. know that future selves will take actions to maximize
their own utility).
The naive system 1 assumption is that actions starting tomorrow
will follow π∗1 (s) (i.e. system 1 is ignorant of system 2’s future plans).
A naive system 1 means that the control cost along a trajectory can
be computed via the Q function of system 1. The per period reward
to system 2 net of control costs can be written as
r2(s,a) −ψ (Q1(s,π∗1 (s),π∗1 ) −Q1(s,a,π∗1 )).
We can thus write the planning problem in standard recursive form
V naiveCC (s,π ) = r2(s,π (s))−
ψ (Q1(s,π∗1 (s),π∗1 ) −Q1(s,a,π∗1 ))+
γ2V
naive
CC (s,π ).
Standard RL methods (value iteration, policy iteration) can be
used to find the policy which optimizes this function: first we com-
pute Q∗1 using a standard method, then we plug in Q
∗
1 and again
apply policy iteration/value iteration to compute the which opti-
mizes V naiveCC .
The sophisticated system 2 model is more nuanced. Here system
1 understands that future actions will come from π instead of π∗1 and
so we write the optimizing function net of control costs as
V
soph
CC (s,π ) = V2(s,π ) −ψ (V1(s,π∗1 ) −V1(s,π )).
The sophisticated formulation is related to the interpretation of 2S
model in [7, 42] where actions are split between a planner and a
doer where the only action of the planner is to be able to change the
utility function of the doer. In the Markov case this would amount to
assuming that the agent starts in state s, the planner gets to change the
doer’s utility function (reward function for each state, action), and
the doer chooses the policy consistent with this new utility function.
This no longer has a simple recursive form becauseV1 andV2 have
different discount rates. However, we now show that policy iteration
can be used even in this compound problem. First, we substitute
the definitions of the value functions into the equations above to
re-express V sCC as
r2(s,π (s)) +ψr1(s,π (s))+
γ2V2(τ (s,a),π ) +ψγ1V1(τ (s,a),π )−
ψV1(s,π∗1 )
At each state the optimal policy value for system 1 V1(s,π∗1 )
is a constant. Thus, we can ignore it for the sake of computing
the optimal policy starting at that state (though not for computing
that policy’s actual value). This means that the sophisticated sys-
tem 1 policy is the one which optimizes the compromise objective
V2(s,π ) +ψV1(s,π ). This also means the cognitive-control based 2S
model is a plausible foundation for the µAgent model [22]. An adap-
tation of the value iteration algorithm can be used to construct an
optimal policy (Algorithm 1). As with standard value iteration, this
algorithm is monotonic (each step has a better policy with respect to
the compromise objective) and thus when the MDP is finite it will
converge to the optimal policy.
Note that while standard techniques can be adapted to construct
plans for sophisticated system 1 agents their policies no longer have
a single associated value function that can be written in standard re-
cursive form. Because system 1 and system 2 have different discount
rates the compromise policy may exhibit behaviors like time incon-
sistency or commitment. Time inconsistency occurs because when
an action affects rewards arbitrarily far in the future the discount
rate of system 2 is the only relevant one and thus these decisions
will look as if they optimize only for r2 while decisions that affect
rewards close in time optimize for a combination of r1 and r2.
Algorithm 1 Value Iteration With Sophisticated System 1
Initialize V1,V2 arbitrarily
while Not converged do
for s ∈ S do
for a ∈ A do
Q1(s,a) = E(r1 | s,a) + γ1V1(τ (s,a))
Q2(s,a) = E(r2 | s,a) + γ2V2(τ (s,a))
Let a∗ = argmaxaψQ1(s,a) +Q2(s,a)
Set Vi (s) = Qi (s,a∗)
With sophisticated 2S planning in hand, we can move on to exam-
ining examples of behavior of 2S agents as well as the differences
between sophisticated and naive system 1 agents.
INVERTING DUAL SYSTEM PLANS
We now turn to the problem of inferring an agent’s reward function
from observed behavior. This problem is particularly important if
we seek to construct AI that can observe human behavior, infer their
desired goal states, and then take actions to help the DM achieve
their goals as in, e.g. an artificial assistant.
We consider the standard inverse reinforcement learning (IRL)
setup. We have access to a dataset of trajectories (sequences of
state-action pairs taken by our agents). We refer to this as D =
{η1,η2,η3 . . .ηN }. We wish to use D to infer the underlying reward
function(s) of the DM. In addition, we wish to provide a statistical
test for the presence of dual-system behavior in a data-set.
We will do this using maximum likelihood estimation as in prior
work [43]. We let θ be the parametrization of the problem (here the
reward function or functions). Our goal will be to find the reward
parameters θ to maximize the likelihood of the data. The Markovian
property of MDPs means that the likelihood of a trajectory ηi can
be computed as
Pr (ηi | θ ) =
∏
(s,a)∈ηi
Pr (a | s,θ ).
We will work with the log likelihood instead which will be
L(D | θ ) =
∑
(s,a)∈D
logPr (a | s,θ ).
With rational agents it is straightforward how to compute L.
Given θ the agent has an optimal policy which has an associated Q
function. We refer to this as Q∗(s,a | θ ). We assume that choices at
each state are made according to a softmax of this Q∗ function
Pr (a | s,θ ) =
exp( 1βQ∗(a, s | θ ))∑
a′ exp( 1βQ∗(a′, s | θ ))
.
Thus the log likelihood is well defined.
We now turn to, given a guess θ calculating the likelihood of
observed trajectories for 2S agents. We begin with the naive system
1 agents. This is the easier of the two cases. Recall that here we can
think of this agent as a rational agent which optimizes a new reward
function which takes the discounted (with system 2 discount rate)
payoffs of the form
rnaive (s,a) = r2(s,a) −ψ (V ∗1 (s) −Q∗1(s,a)).
Thus we can readily compute a Qnaive∗CC function if we can compute
the optimal policy. This gives us a well defined likelihood for any
trajectory.
For sophisticated system 1 agents the problem is a little bit more
complicated. Recall that a sophisticated system 1 agent’s final policy
also optimizes the compromise value function V2(s,π ) +ψV1(s,π ).
We can can write the associated Q function as
Q
soph
CC (s,a,π ) = r2(s,a) + r1(s,a)+
γ2V2(τ (s,a),π ) + γ1V1(τ (s,a),π ).
Given the policy π∗soph we can compute this Q function and plug
it into the softmax equation above. Now we have a well defined
likelihood given the parameters θ .
EXPERIMENT: DONUT KALE GRID WORLD
We consider a Markov grid world. An agent begins in a location and
can move in any of 4 cardinal directions. There are two items placed
on the grid, a kale smoothie and a donut (see Figure 1). The donut
and kale are terminal states of the game. The donut and kale have
rewards for system 1 and system 2 as in the example above. We set
γ2 = .99,γ1 = .6,ψ = 5.
Figure 1 shows the world as well as the trajectories starting from
the corner of the board. The ideal policies of system 1 (grab the
donut) and system 2 (walk to the kale using the shortest possible
path). However, the compromise policies look quite different from
either optimal policy. Indeed, both of them take a path around the
donut (but not the shortest possible path). We see the naive and
sophisticated system 1 policies differ quite a lot with the compromise
policy with the naive system 1 demonstrating giving the donut a very
wide berth.
The difference in final behavior under the naive/sophisticated
assumptions comes down to the following logic. Consider a simple
problem where the DM chooses between 2 actions Stop and Go at
t = 0. If the agent Stops the game ends, otherwise it continues to
t = 1 where the agent also chooses between Stop and Go. If the
agent chooses Stop, the game ends, if the agent chooses Go, he gets
a donut. System 1’s optimal policy is to Go at both stages and eat
the donut. Suppose the cognitive control parameters are such that
agents Stop in period t = 1 (with a control cost). A sophisticated
system 1 then knows at t = 0 that the agent will stop and therefore
there is no control cost for Stop in period 0. However, a naive system
1 always assumes that the agent will Go in the future and therefore
there will be a control cost at period 1. This reasoning is precisely
why the DM in the grid world gives the donut a wide berth under the
naive system 1 assumption but walks exactly one step away under
the sophisticated assumption.
Whether the naive or sophisticated model of cognitive control is
more reflective of real decision-making is an open empirical ques-
tion (though cognitively it seems like the naive assumption is more
Figure 1: Top row shows the trajectories of system 1 and system
2 starting from the corner as well as the full preferred policies
of both systems. Each arrow indicates the direction the agent
will move at that state. States are colored red if starting at that
state leads to the donut and green if it leads to the kale. Bottom
row shows the compromise policies under the 2S model with
naive/sophisticated system 1. The compromise policies are not
pure mixtures of the optimal policies and display behavior such
as precommitment (walking far away from the donut to make
it harder to reach in the future). Last subpanel shows functions
for each of the systems given compromise policies as well as the
map of self control costs incurred by the DM in each state under
the naive assumption
plausible), however, because the models give such precise predic-
tions about the main differences it is an empirically testable one and
a potentially fruitful direction for future research.
EXPERIMENT: IRL IN THE DONUT KALE
GRID WORLD
We now apply the IRL methods above to the Donut Kale grid world
problem. We keep the same true underlying problem parameters
and use the true value functions to construct a dataset of stochastic
trajectories starting from any possible (non-terminal) state. We con-
struct datasets of stochastic trajectories for both kinds of dual system
agents. We sample 50 stochastic trajectories using softmax choice of
actions at each time point with β = .01 starting from any possible
non-terminal state. We give models access to the true discount rates.
We use a large number of trajectories as well as the true discount
rates because the purpose of this experiment is to show that rational
IRL draws problematic inferences even when it has access to large
amounts of data and true discount rates. We refer to these data sets
as Dnaive and Dsoph .
For each of the different assumptions on the true planning function
(rational, sophisticated, naive) optimization of the IRL likelihood
function is relatively slow (because each iteration requires the com-
putation of an optimal policy). In these experiments we found that
the IRL objective functions are very difficult to optimize, methods
that improved the likelihood function only locally ended up finding
very poor minima and we ended up using differential evolution to
optimize the likelihood [39]. In standard rational IRL there exist
assumptions which allow for closed form solutions to gradients at
each optimization step [43]. Unfortunately these assumptions do not
hold in the 2S case, and so an open area for future research is the
efficient computation of solutions to dual-system IRL models.
We the rational, sophisticated, and naive IRL models using maxi-
mum likelihood estimation on the generated datasets. We find that
a rational IRL model recovers that both 2S agents like donuts (this
is because if the DM starts close to the donut then they eat it, thus
the only way to rationalize this is to have positive reward from the
donut). Thus, using rational IRL would lead a designer to make
wrong decisions if they could make interventions (for example, if
they are asked whether the DM would prefer a donut or nothing).
Second, we find that correctly specified models learn the under-
lying preferences quite well. Both the naive and sophisticated IRL
learn that only system 1 prefers donuts. Things are more mixed when
we examine misspecified 2S IRL models. The naive IRL model ap-
plied to the sophisticated data yields wrong inferences just like the
rational model, however the sophisticated model applied to the naive
data gets the order of preferences correct.
CONCLUSION
This work has focused on extending planning and inverse planning
models into the domain of non-rational agents. In particular we
have focused on the dual system framework that has proven to
be successful across the behavioral sciences. We have shown that
standard planning and inverse planning algorithms can be adapted
to 2S agents. Importantly we have shown that incorrectly assuming
that a dual-system agent is a rational agent when trying to infer goals
from behavior can lead to interventions that actually decrease the
overall welfare of the agent.
We have assumed that both system 1 and system 2 have fixed re-
ward functions and use model-based methods for computing optimal
polices. In reality, both systems are constantly learning about the real
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Figure 2: Rational IRL makes incorrect inferences about the
decision-maker’s preferences (d1, d2, k1, k2 refer to inferred
rewards of donuts, kale for system 1 and system 2 respectively).
However, 2S IRL models with correct specification learn that
only system 1 likes donuts (i.e. d1 > 0,d2 < 0). Misspecification
is more of a mixed bag with the sophisticated model learning the
correct preferences when applied to the naive dataset but the
naive model inferring the wrong answer. Lines reflects averages
over 16 replicates, error bars reflect standard deviations.
world. Existing work [20, 21] argues that these systems learn and
plan differently with system 1 being more model-free and system 2
being more model-based. Extending the 2S model presented here to
include both general reinforcement learning and known regularities
in human learning [5, 9, 14] is an important future direction.
We have focused on the domain of time inconsistency but system
1/system 2 conflicts occur in many other domains. Extending the
model here to problems in moral decision-making, decision making
under risk and uncertainty, and cooperation sees like a fruitful di-
rection for future research. In particular, recent work in behavioral
science argues that cooperation is an interplay between a system 1
which learns ‘social heuristics’ and a reward maximizing system 2
[35, 36]. However, formal models of the social heuristics hypothe-
sis (SHH) have been restricted to simple matrix games [3]. The 2S
model presented here is a potential way to expand the SHH to more
complex environments such as Markov social dilemmas [25, 26, 32].
Finally, rational actor models are used explicitly or implicitly
across many applications (a large literature in recommender systems
can be framed as a form of learning latent preferences). Understand-
ing where such models are appropriate and where the assumptions
are so badly broken that they lead to false conclusions is an important
topic for discussion, research, and debate.
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